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PERSONS ACT SHOULD APPLY TO EMINENT DOMAIN 
Vikki Bollettino∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Eminent domain and zoning authority are two important tools 
municipalities and states employ to control land use within their bor-
ders.  When a state or municipality’s right to control land use inter-
sects with an individual’s right to use his property as he sees fit, it is 
not uncommon for tensions to rise.  For example, in Kelo v. City of 
New London1 the Supreme Court of the United States held that an 
economic development plan constituted a public use under the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion,2 thereby making it easier for municipalities to take property that 
is not generating tax revenue and local spending.  State legislatures 
reacted to Kelo with a firestorm of legislation aimed at limiting local 
eminent domain powers.3 
The issue of land use control through zoning and eminent do-
main becomes even more heated when state authority conflicts with 
an individual’s First Amendment right to freely exercise his religious 
beliefs, as protected by the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause.4  
Seeking to balance the state’s right to control land use with the indi-
vidual’s free exercise right, Congress passed the Religious Land Use 
 
 ∗ J.D., May 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2001, Connecticut 
College. 
 1 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 2 Id. at 483–89. 
 3 Patricia H. Lee, Eminent Domain: In the Aftermath of Kelo v. New London, a Re-
surrection in Norwood: One Public Interest Attorney’s View, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 121, 
134 (2006) (noting that “[i]mmediately following the United States Supreme Court’s 
2005 Kelo decision, ‘legislatures in 28 states have introduced more than 70 bills 
aimed at curbing local eminent domain powers’”). 
 4 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free 
exercise [of religion] . . . .”). 
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and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 2000.5  RLUIPA pro-
vides that government regulations that substantially burden the free 
exercise of religion may be imposed only to further a compelling 
government interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve that in-
terest.6  This standard is also known as the strict scrutiny test.7  Adopt-
ing the individualized assessment distinction set forth in Employment 
Division v. Smith,8 RLUIPA mandates strict scrutiny review of individu-
alized applications of regulatory land use laws.9  Surprisingly, RLUIPA 
is written to apply only to zoning and landmarking laws that substan-
tially burden religious exercise.  However, religious institutions are 
particularly vulnerable to takings in the post-Kelo environment, and 
several facing condemnation have used RLUIPA to challenge the ex-
ercise of eminent domain authority as well.10  Whether land use regu-
lation burdens free exercise through the application of a zoning law 
or through the exercise of eminent domain, both land use tools re-
quire an individualized assessment of their impact on the target 
property, and therefore under Smith both require a strict scrutiny 
analysis if their application burdens the free exercise of religion.11  
Applying RLUIPA to zoning and landmarking laws but not to exer-
cises of eminent domain risks inconsistency and divergent case law.  
Alternatively, applying RLUIPA to both zoning laws and takings 
would develop precedent and consistency within the category of land 
use control of religious property. 
This Comment argues that eminent domain, like zoning, should 
be subject to strict scrutiny review under RLUIPA.  Part II discusses a 
pending case, Albanian Associated Fund v. Township of Wayne,12 to illu-
 
 5 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006).  RLUIPA was Congress’s second at-
tempt to provide protection for free exercise following the invalidation of the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 in City of Boerne v. Flores.  Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 
1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)). 
 6 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
 7 See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 165 n.24 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (stating that in order to meet the strict scrutiny standard, a law must be 
“narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest”). 
 8 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 9 See infra Part VII.  Smith provides that where a generally applicable law has the 
incidental effect of burdening the free exercise of religion, the Free Exercise Clause 
is not frustrated.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 893 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  However, if the 
individualized application of a state law burdens free exercise, that law must pass 
strict scrutiny review.  Id. at 894. 
 10 See infra Part IV. 
 11 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (majority opinion). 
 12 No. 06-3217 (D.N.J. filed July 17, 2006). 
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strate how eminent domain may hamper free exercise.  Part III out-
lines the history and discusses the relevant provisions of RLUIPA.  
Part IV describes the current debate over whether RLUIPA should 
apply to eminent domain actions through a discussion of current case 
law.  Part V argues that eminent domain may be exercised in a man-
ner that is analogous to the application of a zoning law, and therefore 
should be similarly subject to strict scrutiny review when it burdens 
free exercise.  Part VI illustrates how zoning and eminent domain are 
used together to achieve the broader purpose of land use regulation, 
and thus both should be reviewed using a strict scrutiny analysis.  Part 
VII discusses the need for strict scrutiny review of eminent domain 
condemnations of religious property post-Kelo.  Ultimately, this 
Comment argues that since government frequently exercises both its 
zoning and eminent domain authority for the broader purpose of 
land use regulation, eminent domain challenges, like zoning chal-
lenges, should receive strict scrutiny review under RLUIPA. 
II. EMINENT DOMAIN AND RLUIPA:  
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROBLEM 
On July 17, 2006, the Albanian Associated Fund (AAF) filed a 
complaint against the Township of Wayne (“township”) alleging that 
the township improperly delayed the AAF’s land development appli-
cation to build a mosque on AAF property, despite the fact that reli-
gious worship was a permitted use within that zone.13  The AAF, a re-
ligious non-profit organization, was created for the purpose of 
establishing a mosque to provide a public place of worship for the 
Albanian Muslim community in northeastern New Jersey.14  The 
community, which numbered approximately two hundred at the time 
the complaint was filed, had been using a facility that was inadequate 
in terms of size and location.15  To meet the needs of its congrega-
tion, the AAF purchased the disputed property in October 2001.16  
On October 17, 2002, the AAF submitted a land development appli-
cation to the township stating its intention to develop the property as 
a religious facility.17  In an attempt to address the township’s concerns 
regarding a potential increase in automobile traffic and damage to 
 
 13 Complaint at 2, Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-3217 
(D.N.J. filed July 17, 2006). 
 14 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 5, Albanian 
Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 6-3217 (D.N.J. filed July 17, 2006). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Complaint, supra note 13, at 22. 
 17 Id. at 29. 
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the environment, the AAF revised its site plan three times and ap-
peared before the township planning board over twenty times from 
February 2003 through May 2006.18  Finally, on April 5, 2006, the 
township passed a resolution in furtherance of its “Open Space and 
Recreation Plan” that sought to condemn the AAF’s property, thus 
putting an end to the AAF’s development application.19  The town-
ship further stated that the mosque property “was identified . . . for 
preservation.”20 
The AAF challenged the condemnation as a violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause of both the United States Constitution21 and the New 
Jersey Constitution,22 the Equal Protection Clause of both the United 
States Constitution23 and the New Jersey Constitution,24 the “public 
use” requirement of the Takings Clause of the United States Consti-
tution,25 and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.26  Further, 
the AAF argued that the condemnation imposed a substantial burden 
on the AAF’s free exercise of religion in violation of RLUIPA.27  The 
township’s motion for summary judgment was denied on October 1, 
2007.28 
Albanian Associated Fund v. Township of Wayne29 illustrates the tar-
geted land use regulation Congress sought to address with RLUIPA.  
RLUIPA codified the individualized assessment exception to Employ-
ment Division v. Smith.30  In Smith, the Supreme Court held that if a 
state has a system under which it may grant individualized exemp-
tions from a generally applicable law, the state cannot decline to 
grant such an exemption without a compelling purpose in a situation 
 
 18 Id. at 39–43. 
 19 Id. at 55–60. 
 20 Id. at 60. 
 21 Id. at 75. 
 22 Complaint, supra note 13, at 76. 
 23 Id. at 81. 
 24 Id. at 83. 
 25 Id. at 85. 
 26 Id. at 87. 
 27 Id. at 77–79. 
 28 See Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-3217, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 73176, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007) (order denying motion for summary judg-
ment).  The U.S. Department of Justice intervened on behalf of the AAF and filed an 
amicus brief on July 19, 2007.  Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Opposi-
tion to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Albanian Associated Fund v. 
Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-3217 (D.N.J. filed July 19, 2007), available at 
http://www.becketfund.org/files/c1aad.pdf. 
 29 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73176 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007). 
 30 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
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where the law burdens the free exercise of religion.31  As Albanian As-
sociated Fund demonstrates, eminent domain may be used in an indi-
vidualized manner; the township specifically identified the AAF 
property as one for preservation under its plan.32  Because an indivi-
dualized exercise of land use regulatory tools would be subject to 
strict scrutiny under Smith, the strict scrutiny standard should apply to 
any individualized land use control that burdens the free exercise of 
religion, whether it be achieved through zoning or eminent domain. 
As this Comment will discuss, the exercise of eminent domain 
may require an individualized assessment of the taking, for example, 
through public hearings where the municipality or state evaluates the 
effect of the taking on a particular property.33  Further, eminent do-
main and zoning are commonly used in conjunction for land use 
regulation.34  Because eminent domain and zoning are two land use 
controls that are frequently used together to effect regulatory 
schemes, it is incongruous to apply strict scrutiny to one and not the 
other.  RLUIPA was meant to be a comprehensive act addressing 
what Congress found to be the frequent burdening of free exercise 
within the land use context.35  Applying strict scrutiny to one regula-
tory tool, zoning, and not to another, eminent domain, would lead to 
divergent case law, which would be an illogical result considering the 
frequency with which these two regulatory tools are used together 
and the similarities in their application.36 
III. BACKGROUND 
In 2000 Congress passed RLUIPA in an effort to address what it 
determined to be a frequent burdening of free exercise rights in the 
land use and institutional context.37  The path leading to RLUIPA’s 
passage began with the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Em-
ployment Division v. Smith.38  Prior to Smith, the strict scrutiny standard 
 
 31 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
 32 Complaint, supra note 13, at 60. 
 33 See infra Part V.D. 
 34 See infra Part VI. 
 35 146 CONG. REC. 16,698–99 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kenne-
dy). 
 36 See infra Parts V, VI. 
 37 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kenne-
dy).  In the institutionalized persons context, RLUIPA requires a strict scrutiny analy-
sis of government action that substantially burdens the religious exercise of “a person 
residing in or confined to an institution.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).  This Comment 
addresses RLUIPA in the land use context only. 
 38 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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was applied to all free exercise challenges.39  Smith signaled a remark-
able shift from this standard.40 
In Smith the Court moved from its previous strict scrutiny ex-
amination of regulations that burdened the free exercise of religion 
and held that where a generally applicable law had the incidental ef-
fect of burdening free exercise, the Court would apply rational basis 
review.41  The respondents in Smith challenged an Oregon criminal 
statute that prohibited the possession of controlled substances, in-
cluding peyote.42  The respondents were dismissed from employment 
because they had ingested peyote.43  The Employment Division de-
nied respondents’ petition for unemployment benefits because res-
pondents had been dismissed for “misconduct.”44  The respondents 
argued that the Oregon criminal statute hampered the free exercise 
of their religion because they had ingested the peyote as a sacrament 
at a ceremony of the Native American Church to which they be-
longed.45  The issue before the Court was whether the Oregon statute, 
which did not contain an exception for the sacramental use of con-
trolled substances, impermissibly burdened the free exercise of reli-
gion in violation of the First Amendment.46  The Court upheld the 
Oregon law, stating that if hampering free exercise was “merely the 
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provi-
sion, the First Amendment has not been offended.”47  However, the 
Court clarified that where the state had a system for granting exemp-
tions from a generally applicable law on an individualized basis, the 
state could not decline such an exemption in cases where the law 
burdened religion without a compelling purpose.48 
Congress reacted to Smith by enacting the Religious Freedom 
and Restoration Act (RFRA), which mandated strict scrutiny review of 
laws that substantially burden religious exercise, regardless of the 
 
 39 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (stating that “only those inter-
ests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate 
claims to the free exercise of religion”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) 
(holding that if state legislation had the incidental effect of burdening the free exer-
cise of religion, it could be justified only by a compelling state interest). 
 40 Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Court’s 
holding “dramatically departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence”). 
 41 Id. at 878 (majority opinion). 
 42 Id. at 875. 
 43 Id. at 874. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
 47 Id. at 878. 
 48 Id. at 884. 
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type of law.49  Specifically, RFRA’s purpose was to “restore the compel-
ling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 and to guarantee its ap-
plication in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially 
burdened.”50  However, Congress’s attempt to restore strict scrutiny 
was short-lived; four years after its passage, the Supreme Court in City 
of Boerne v. Flores held that RFRA was unconstitutional as an imper-
missible exercise of Congress’s remedial powers under the Four-
teenth Amendment.51 
In City of Boerne v. Flores the Supreme Court found that in passing 
RFRA Congress had overstepped its authority under the Enforcement 
Clause, which provides Congress with the power to remedy violations 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, but does not permit Congress to de-
fine the substance of Fourteenth Amendment rights.52  Further, when 
Congress exercises its remedial powers, its response to a violation 
must be both proportional and congruent.53  The Court held that 
RFRA was neither a proportional nor congruent response to a consti-
tutional violation, but instead was a substantive change in constitu-
tional law.54  Because RFRA applied at the local, state, and federal le-
vels, the Court found that its broad coverage “ensures its intrusion at 
every level of government.”55  Ultimately, the Court held RFRA un-
constitutional because it was “broader than is appropriate if the goal 
is to prevent and remedy constitutional violations.”56  Today, RFRA is 
valid only as applied to federal government action.57 
A. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
Congress passed RLUIPA in 2000.58  RLUIPA reinstates the strict 
scrutiny standard of RFRA but in a more limited manner.59  RLUIPA 
mandates strict scrutiny review of government action that substantial-
 
 49 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)). 
 50 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006). 
 51 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
 52 Id. at 519−20. 
 53 Id. at 532. 
 54 Id.  
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 535. 
 57 See, e.g., O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 
973, 976 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 58 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006). 
 59 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy). 
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ly burdens the exercise of religion.60  RLUIPA applies this analysis to 
land use regulations and government actions affecting people in state 
institutions, such as state penitentiaries.61  Thus, Congress sought to 
restore the strict scrutiny standard of RFRA, but in a more limited 
manner so as to avoid colliding with the same constitutional issues 
that caused RFRA’s demise.62  The congressional hearing record de-
monstrates that the Free Exercise Clause was frequently violated in a 
land use context, and RLUIPA was specifically meant to address this 
issue.63  Under RLUIPA: 
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation 
in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious 
exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, 
unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the bur-
den on that person, assembly, or institution— 
     (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and 
     (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.64 
Within the land use context, RLUIPA applies where: 
(A) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity 
that receives Federal financial assistance, even if the burden re-
sults from a rule of general applicability; 
(B) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial 
burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the 
several States, or with Indian tribes, even if the burden results 
from a rule of general applicability; or 
(C) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a 
land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under 
which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal 
procedures or practices that permit the government to make, in-
dividualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property in-
volved.65 
Lastly, under RLUIPA a land use regulation is defined as a “zoning or 
landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts 
a claimant’s use or development of land.”66  In terms of its applica-
tion, RLUIPA should be “construed in favor of a broad protection of 
 
 60 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
 61 Id. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5. 
 62 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy). 
 63 Id. 
 64 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
 65 Id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A)–(C). 
 66 Id. § 2000cc-5(5) (emphasis added). 
BOLLETTINO (Final Edit) 1/13/2010  5:17 PM 
2009] COMMENT 1271 
religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of 
this chapter and the Constitution.”67  When bringing a claim under 
RLUIPA, the claimant must first establish that the government action 
substantially burdens the free exercise of his religion.68  Once a clai-
mant has sufficiently demonstrated a substantial burden, the gov-
ernment has the burden of proving that its action is the least restric-
tive means of advancing a compelling government interest.69 
B. Variations on the Definition of “Substantial Burden” 
Courts have attempted to define “substantial burden” in various 
ways.  In Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago,70 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit established a strict 
standard for what type of regulation would constitute a substantial 
burden.  The appellants, an association of Chicago-area churches, 
claimed that both the lack of affordable housing and the costs of 
complying with the procedural requirements for obtaining a special 
use permit together imposed a substantial burden on the free exer-
cise of their religion.71  The court found that the steps an applicant 
would need to take to comply with the Chicago zoning ordinance did 
not amount to a substantial burden upon religion.72  In defining sub-
stantial burden, the court stated that the burden would be one that 
“necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for 
rendering religious exercise . . . effectively impracticable.”73  Because 
appellants had failed to make a prima facie showing of this type of 
burden, they failed to establish that government action substantially 
burdened religion as required to bring a claim under RLUIPA.74 
Not all courts have been so demanding.  In Guru Nanak Sikh So-
ciety v. County of Sutter,75 the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of California criticized the “extremely high threshold” the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit set for bring-
ing a claim under RLUIPA.76  In Guru Nanak, the plaintiff applied for 
a conditional use permit in order to build a Sikh temple within a res-
 
 67 Id. § 2000cc-3(g). 
 68 Id. § 2000cc-2(b). 
 69 Id. 
 70 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 71 Id. at 761. 
 72 Id. at 762. 
 73 Id. at 761. 
 74 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(b). 
 75 326 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (E.D. Cal. 2003). 
 76 Id. at 1153. 
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idential zone where churches and temples were conditionally permit-
ted.77  Churches and temples were not a permitted use in any of the 
districts within Sutter County, but instead were allowed within six dis-
tricts only if accompanied by a conditional use permit.78  The Sutter 
County Board denied the plaintiff’s application, effectively shutting 
his temple out of the entire county.79  The plaintiff claimed that both 
Sutter County’s land use scheme and the board’s denial of his condi-
tional use permit violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution, as well as RLUIPA.80 
The court began its analysis by finding that the plaintiff’s desire 
to build a religious temple was “religious exercise” as defined by 
RLUIPA, stating that the “requirement that there be a facility for re-
ligious assembly is common and fundamental to many of the world’s 
religions.”81  In addressing whether the denial and land use scheme 
constituted a substantial burden, the court rejected the Seventh Cir-
cuit test articulated in Civil Liberties and instead defined a substantial 
burden as “one which actually inhibits religious practice by virtue of a 
land use decision.”82  Because the plaintiff had established a prima fa-
cie case of substantial burden, and because the county failed to coun-
teract that claim with a compelling government interest, the court 
found that the denial of the permit was a violation of RLUIPA.83  
Thus, in order to bring a claim under RLUIPA, the claimant, at a 
minimum, must be able to establish that the land use regulation has 
the effect of inhibiting the free exercise of religion. 
C. Defining “Compelling Government Interest” 
Under RLUIPA, if a government-imposed land use regulation 
inflicts a substantial burden on free exercise, a strict scrutiny analysis 
is applied and the government must show that the burden is imposed 
in furtherance of a compelling government interest and that the land 
use restriction is the least restrictive means of furthering that inter-
est.84  RLUIPA itself does not define what qualifies as a compelling 
government interest.  However, the legislative history reveals that 
 
 77 Id. at 1142. 
 78 Id. at 1146. 
 79 Id. at 1145–46. 
 80 Id. at 1146. 
 81 Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1146. 
 82 Id. at 1154. 
 83 Id. 
 84 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006). 
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“[t]he phrase . . . is taken directly from RFRA . . . and is intended to 
codify the traditional compelling interest test.”85 
The Supreme Court has articulated several definitions of what 
constitutes a compelling government interest.  For example, in Sher-
bert v. Verner,86 South Carolina defended the denial of unemployment 
benefits for the plaintiff under the South Carolina Unemployment 
Compensation Act as being necessary to avoid fraudulent claims 
which would diminish the unemployment compensation fund.87  
However, the Supreme Court found that the state’s interest in pre-
venting fraud did not constitute a compelling government interest.88  
Instead, the Court held that “[o]nly the gravest abuses endangering 
paramount interests give occasion for permissible limitation.”89 
Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,90 the Supreme Court found that 
the state’s interest in education was not a compelling government in-
terest worthy of permissible infringement on the respondents’ free 
exercise rights.91  In Yoder, the respondents, members of the Conserv-
ative Mennonite Church, were charged with violating Wisconsin’s 
compulsory school attendance law, which required attendance by 
members until the age of sixteen.92  The respondents refused to 
comply with the law on the grounds that high school education was 
contrary to the Amish religion.93  The Court found that the state’s in-
terest in high school attendance was not of adequate significance to 
justify infringing upon the respondents’ right to free exercise of reli-
gion.94  In so holding, the Court stated that “[o]nly those interests of 
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance le-
gitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”95 
Although compelling government interest is not defined in 
RLUIPA, several courts addressing the issue have determined what 
does not qualify as a compelling interest.  For example, in Mintz v. 
 
 85 146 CONG. REC. 19,123 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady). 
 86 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 87 Id. at 407. 
 88 Id. at 408–09. 
 89 Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
 90 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 91 Id. at 234–35. 
 92 Id. at 207. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 234–35. 
 95 Id. at 215; see also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 546 (1993) (stating that “[a] law of restrictive religious practice must advance 
‘interests of the highest order’ and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those in-
terests”). 
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Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield,96 the United States District Court 
for the District of Massachusetts concluded that maintaining the set-
back and coverage requirements listed in the town’s zoning bylaw was 
not a compelling interest.97  The diocese owned property in Lenox, 
Massachusetts, which housed both a church (“St. Ann’s”) and a rec-
tory.98  St. Ann’s sought to construct a parish center whose building 
plans did not meet the coverage and setback requirements of the by-
law.99  After St. Ann’s applied for a building permit, the Lenox Special 
Town Counsel issued an opinion stating its belief that the section of 
the bylaw at issue violated RLUIPA, leading the Zoning Board of Ap-
peals (ZBA) to grant the permit.100  The plaintiffs, who owned proper-
ty surrounding St. Ann’s, sued both the diocese and the ZBA seeking 
a revocation of the permit.101  The district court agreed with the ZBA 
and held that “setback and coverage requirements reveal no particu-
larly compelling interest.”102  Further, discussing the other possible in-
terests of limited parking and congestion, the court found that 
“[p]rior to RLUIPA . . . such concerns were not universally consi-
dered compelling.”103  The court ultimately found the setback and 
coverage requirements violated RLUIPA.104 
In Elsinore Christian Center v. City of Lake Elsinore,105 the United 
States District Court for the Central District of California held that 
the city’s interest in generating tax revenue did not represent a com-
pelling government interest, but suggested that the desire to combat 
urban blight may qualify as a compelling interest.106  Faced with in-
adequate parking, the Elsinore Christian Center (“Church”) pur-
chased property in an economically depressed area of downtown 
Lake Elsinore.107  Churches were permitted in the location subject to 
the grant of a conditional use permit (“CUP”), which the city’s plan-
ning commission declined to issue based on factors including the 
 
 96 424 F. Supp. 2d 309 (D. Mass. 2006). 
 97 Id. at 323. 
 98 Id. at 311. 
 99 Id. at 312–13. 
 100 Id. at 313. 
 101 Id. at 310. 
 102 Mintz, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 323. 
 103 Id. at 324 (citing Love Church v. City of Evanston, 671 F. Supp. 515, 519 (N.D. 
Ill. 1987)). 
 104 Id. at 328. 
 105 291 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
 106 Id. at 1093. 
 107 Id. at 1086. 
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prevention of a loss of property tax revenue.108  The Church sued, al-
leging that the zoning ordinance and denial of the CUP violated 
RLUIPA.109  Rejecting the city’s tax revenue justifications, the court 
held that “maintenance of property tax revenue is a potentially pre-
textual basis for decision-making that [was] a specific target of 
RLUIPA.”110  Addressing the city’s interest in combating urban blight, 
the court stated that the interest in preserving the quality of urban 
life was of “[p]aramount importance in land use planning.”111  How-
ever, the court stopped short of defining the interest in curbing 
blight as compelling because it found that the city’s denial of the 
CUP was not taken in furtherance of that interest as required by 
RLUIPA.112 
At least one court has defined a city’s interest in maintaining its 
zoning regulations as compelling.  In Konikov v. Orange County,113 the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held 
that even if the plaintiff had been capable of demonstrating a sub-
stantial burden on his right to free exercise, the county had estab-
lished that it had a compelling interest in enforcing its zoning 
scheme, and it had done so in the least restrictive manner possible.114  
The plaintiff in Konikov was a rabbi who began conducting religious 
services on the property he owned in a residential neighborhood.115  
Surrounding property owners notified the Orange County Code En-
forcement Division, which issued a code violation notice and gave the 
plaintiff seven days to come into compliance with the code.116  Ap-
proximately one month later a hearing was held before the Code En-
forcement Board.117  The hearing included witness testimony and the 
introduction of evidence gathered from an eight-month investiga-
tion.118  At the hearing’s conclusion, the Board required the plaintiff 
to obtain special exception approval if he wished to continue offering 
the religious services.119  The plaintiff declined and instead filed suit, 
arguing that the county’s land use code violated both the United 
 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 1087. 
 110 Id. at 1093. 
 111 Elsinore, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. 
 112 Id. 
 113 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2003). 
 114 Id. at 1343. 
 115 Id. at 1331. 
 116 Id. at 1332. 
 117 Id. at 1333. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Konikov, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1336. 
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States and Florida Constitutions and RLUIPA.120  The court found 
that the county’s actions survived the application of the strict scrutiny 
standard, stating that a “[g]overnment’s interest in zoning is indeed 
compelling.”121  Ultimately, the court found that the county’s zoning 
code did not violate either the Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA.122 
Because there is no consensus, it is difficult to predict whether a 
court faced with an RLUIPA claim would find that the city or county’s 
interest in enforcing its zoning code constitutes a compelling gov-
ernment interest, as required under strict scrutiny review.123  It is clear 
that when challenging a land use regulation under RLUIPA, the 
claimant must first establish that the regulation imposes a substantial 
burden on the free exercise of religion before the regulation must be 
justified by a compelling government interest.124  That compelling 
government interest must be something akin to those articulated in 
Sherbert and Yoder.125 
IV. CURRENT SPLIT OVER WHETHER RLUIPA APPLIES  
TO EXERCISES OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
As Part IV of this Comment will illustrate, because the public 
hearing element that accompanies an eminent domain condemna-
tion is analogous to the individualized assessment that occurs in the 
granting or denial of a zoning variance, strict scrutiny is the appro-
 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 1343; see also First Baptist Church of Perrine v. Miami-Dade County, 768 
So. 2d 1114, 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the county “clearly has a 
compelling interest in enacting and enforcing fair and reasonable zoning regula-
tions”). 
 122 Konikov, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 1343, 1345. 
 123 Id. at 1333. 
 124 See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y v. County of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1154 
(E.D. Cal. 2003). 
 125 146 CONG. REC. 19,123 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady).  RLUIPA has been 
challenged as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s Section V remedial authori-
ty.  However, as the hearing records for both RFRA and RLUIPA suggest, Congress 
felt a strict scrutiny standard was necessary to protect the right to the free exercise of 
religion from unnecessary governmental intrusion.  146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) 
(joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy); 138 CONG. REC. 18,016–17 (1992) 
(statement of Sen. Kennedy).  Specifically, Congress found that there was “massive 
evidence” in RLUIPA’s hearing record that discrimination in the land use context 
was widespread.  146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and 
Kennedy).  Further, when rejecting a challenge to RLUIPA’s constitutionality in Ligh-
thouse Community Church of God v. City of Southfield, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan stated that it aligned itself with “all circuit courts, and 
almost all district courts . . . [which] have found RLUIPA is a constitutional use of 
congressional power under Section V . . . .”  Lighthouse Cmty. Church of God v. City 
of Southfield, No. 05-40220, 2007 WL 30280, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2007). 
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priate analysis for both land use regulatory tools.  Under current Su-
preme Court jurisprudence that stems from Employment Division v. 
Smith126 and Sherbert v. Verner,127 where the government has in place a 
system of individualized assessment, the denial of an exemption in 
situations where free exercise is burdened must be justified by a 
compelling government purpose.  RLUIPA sought to codify the indi-
vidualized assessment exception to Smith.128  Because eminent domain 
can be exercised in an individualized manner, strict scrutiny should 
apply where its use burdens the free exercise of religion. 
District Courts are divided over whether the strict scrutiny stan-
dard applied to zoning provisions challenged under RLUIPA should 
be applied to eminent domain condemnations as well.  Thus far, only 
the United States District Court for the Central District of California 
has applied a strict scrutiny analysis to an eminent domain condem-
nation.129  However, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois left open the possibility that there may be situations 
where eminent domain, specifically when used in conjunction with 
zoning regulations, should also receive a strict scrutiny analysis.130  Be-
cause eminent domain and zoning provisions are frequently used to-
gether to effectuate a broader regulatory land use plan, it would be 
incongruous to apply a strict scrutiny analysis to one and not the oth-
er. 
A. Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment 
Agency131 
In Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, the 
United States District Court for the Central District of California used 
 
 126 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 127 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 128 See 146 CONG. REC. 16,699 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kenne-
dy): 
The General Rules in s2(a)(1), requiring that substantial burdens on 
religious exercise be justified by a compelling interest, applies only to 
cases within the spending power or the commerce power, or to cases 
where government has authority to make individualized assessments of 
the proposed uses to which the property will be put. Where govern-
ment makes such individualized assessments, permitting some uses and 
excluding others, it cannot exclude religious uses without compelling 
justification. 
 129 Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 
1203, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 130 St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 900 
(N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 131 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
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strict scrutiny to analyze the denial of the plaintiff’s CUP and the 
city’s subsequent exercise of eminent domain to the plaintiff’s prop-
erty.132  In 1990, the City of Cypress adopted a redevelopment plan 
and classified several parcels within the area to be redeveloped—
including the parcel the plaintiff would later purchase—as blighted.133  
Cottonwood Christian Center (“Cottonwood”) had outgrown its site 
of worship and purchased two parcels within the redevelopment area 
in September 1999.134  On October 6, 2000, Cottonwood submitted an 
application for a CUP.135  On October 26, the City Planning Manager 
notified Cottonwood that its application was incomplete because it 
lacked design review studies.136  Four days later, the city council im-
posed a moratorium on CUPs while it examined possibilities for re-
development of the area.137  By 2001, the city had neared completion 
of its plans for redevelopment of the area, which included the addi-
tion of a large Costco store.138  In February 2002, the Cypress Center 
Redevelopment Agency made an offer to purchase the Cottonwood 
property, which was refused.139  In May 2002, the city filed an action to 
condemn the land.140  Cottonwood filed suit claiming that the con-
demnation violated RLUIPA.141 
In analyzing Cottonwood’s claims, the court found that strict 
scrutiny should apply for several reasons.142  First, the court found that 
Cottonwood’s plan to build a church on its new property and subse-
quent church activities would have a significant impact on interstate 
commerce,143 thus bringing the claim within RLUIPA’s jurisdiction.144  
Second, the court found that the city’s denial of Cottonwood’s CUP 
qualified as a land use regulation under the RLUIPA.145  Most notably, 
the court stated that “[e]ven if the Court were only considering the 
condemnation proceedings, they would fall under RLUIPA’s defini-
tion of ‘land use regulation’ . . . . The Redevelopment Agency’s au-
 
 132 Id. at 1219–20. 
 133 Id. at 1211. 
 134 Id. at 1213. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1213. 
 138 Id. at 1214. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 1214–15. 
 141 Id. at 1218. 
 142 Id. at 1221–24. 
 143 Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1221–22. 
 144 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
 145 Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1222. 
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thority to exercise eminent domain . . . is based on a zoning system 
developed by the City.”146  The court interpreted RLUIPA’s statutory 
language, which defines land use regulation as a “zoning or land-
marking law, or the application of such a law,”147 to apply to the city’s use 
of eminent domain as based on the zoning system set forth in the re-
development plan.148  Because the city was using eminent domain as 
an instrument to enact a broader land use regulatory plan, the court 
found that the city’s exercise of eminent domain should likewise be 
subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.149  The court held that the city’s in-
terests in generating revenue and combating blight failed to meet the 
compelling interest standard required where strict scrutiny is applied 
to government action that burdens the free exercise of religion.150  
Finally, the court found the city had failed to demonstrate that there 
was no other way to generate revenue without taking the church 
property.151 
B. Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton152 
Unlike the Cottonwood court, in Faith Temple Church v. Town of 
Brighton, the United States District Court for the Western District of 
New York found RLUIPA did not apply to eminent domain condem-
nations.153  In 2004, the Faith Temple congregation had grown too 
large for its site of worship and purchased a larger parcel of land.154  
However, unbeknownst to Faith Temple, in a 2000 update of its com-
prehensive plan, the Town of Brighton had recommended annexing 
that same parcel to facilitate the expansion of an adjacent park.155  In 
2004, the town initiated condemnation of the Faith Temple parcel.156  
Addressing Faith Temple’s RLUIPA claim, the court found that 
RLUIPA did not apply because eminent domain is not a “zoning law” 
as defined under the RLUIPA.157  Faith Temple argued that the con-
demnation was tied to the comprehensive plan and therefore 
 
 146 Id. at 1222 n.9. 
 147 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (emphasis added). 
 148 Cottonwood, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 n.9. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 1228. 
 151 Id. at 1228–29. 
 152 405 F. Supp. 2d 250 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 153 Id. at 255. 
 154 Id. at 251. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 251–52. 
 157 Id. at 254. 
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amounted to the application of a zoning law.158  However, the court 
rejected this argument because, unlike the Cottonwood court, it found 
the relationship between eminent domain and zoning too atte-
nuated.159 
C. City & County of Honolulu v. Sherman160 and St. John’s 
United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago161 
In City & County of Honolulu v. Sherman and St. John’s United 
Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, both the Supreme Court of Hawaii 
and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illi-
nois, respectively, left open the possibility that where eminent do-
main is used with other land use regulatory tools that require indivi-
dualized assessments, strict scrutiny review of condemnations of 
religious property may be appropriate.162  In Sherman, the Supreme 
Court of Hawaii held that the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu 
(ROH) challenged by the First United Methodist Church did not 
amount to a zoning or landmarking law, and therefore, the court 
found RLUIPA inapplicable.163  The ROH authorized the City of Ho-
nolulu to obtain a fee simple interest in the land located underneath 
condominium developments from current landowners in order to 
convey fee simple title to the leasing occupants of the units.164  The 
First United Methodist Church owned several units within a condo-
minium building on the island.165  The church challenged the con-
demnation, claiming it violated RLUIPA.166  The Supreme Court of 
Hawaii held that the ROH could not be classified as either a land-
marking or zoning law, and, therefore, RLUIPA did not apply.167  
However, the court also stated that the “condemnation right, stand-
ing alone, is not a ‘zoning law.’”168  This statement leaves open the 
 
 158 Faith Temple, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 256. 
 159 Id. at 257. 
 160 129 P.3d 542 (Haw. 2006). 
 161 401 F. Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 162 Id. (holding that although strict scrutiny was not required where the city of 
Chicago condemned a religiously affiliated cemetery, not all condemnations were by 
definition outside of RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny mandate); Sherman, 129 P.3d at 564 
(holding that when the condemnation right is exercised alone without other regula-
tory land use controls, strict scrutiny is not required under RLUIPA). 
 163 Sherman, 129 P.3d at 564. 
 164 Id. at 545 n.1. 
 165 Id. at 546. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 564. 
 168 Id. 
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possibility that when an eminent domain condemnation is not “stand-
ing alone,” but instead is used in conjunction with other land use 
regulatory tools, strict scrutiny may be appropriate. 
In St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois analyzed a 
claim that the expansion of Chicago’s O’Hare Airport onto church 
property violated RLUIPA.169  In 2002, Chicago commenced its plan 
to build new runways as part of an expansion of the O’Hare Interna-
tional Airport.170  The construction required the city to acquire sever-
al parcels of land, including a cemetery affiliated with St. John’s.171  
The affected plaintiffs, including St. John’s, succeeded in enjoining 
the condemnation in 2002.172  In response to a request from the City 
of Chicago, the Illinois General Assembly passed the O’Hare Moder-
nization Act (OMA),173 which amended the Illinois Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act (IRFRA)174 to specifically state that IRFRA did 
not limit the authority of Chicago to use its powers under the OMA to 
relocate cemeteries.175  St. John’s responded to the OMA by filing suit 
in 2003 under both the United States Constitution and RLUIPA, 
claiming the condemnation would substantially burden its religious 
beliefs.176 
The court determined that the city’s exercise of eminent domain 
did not stem from a zoning regulation or landmarking law and thus 
was not governed by RLUIPA.177  St. John’s argued that, according to 
Cottonwood, all exercises of eminent domain are governed by 
RLUIPA.178  The court instead interpreted Cottonwood as standing for 
the proposition that, where eminent domain is used in conjunction 
with zoning regulations, RLUIPA would be applicable.179  St. John’s 
argued that Chicago’s condemnation of the cemetery was related to 
land use regulation because the condemnation would impose a re-
striction on St. John’s use of the property.180  The court rejected this 
 
 169 401 F. Supp. 2d 887, 891–92 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
 170 Id. at 890. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 891. 
 173 O’Hare Modernization Act, 620 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/5 (2003). 
 174 Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1-99 
(1998). 
 175 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/30 (1998). 
 176 St. John’s United Church of Christ, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 891–92. 
 177 Id. at 899. 
 178 Id. at 899–900. 
 179 Id. at 900. 
 180 Id. 
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argument and stated that, in condemning the property, Chicago was 
not acting pursuant to a zoning or landmarking law, but that the 
court’s decision “should not be taken to mean that all condemnation 
proceedings necessarily are outside the scope of RLUIPA.”181  The 
court went on to hypothesize that “an act to acquire land (through 
eminent domain) and then to rezone it and transfer it might very 
well fall with [sic] the reach of RLUIPA.”182  As Part V of this Com-
ment illustrates, eminent domain and zoning are often used in this 
manner to implement a broader regulatory land use scheme.183 
Based on the interpretation of RLUIPA in Sherman and St. John’s, 
where zoning and eminent domain are used together to implement a 
regulatory scheme, strict scrutiny should apply.  In Sherman, the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii distinguished between the State’s eminent 
domain power when used alone and when used in conjunction with a 
zoning law.184  Sherman presented a unique situation: the purpose of 
the ROH was to facilitate the lease-to-fee conversion, not to rezone or 
change the nature of the property use permitted.185  However, emi-
nent domain may be used in conjunction with zoning to effectuate a 
broader regulatory scheme, as in Cottonwood.186  Based on the statutory 
language of “or application of,” where eminent domain is used to 
take religious property in order to implement a broader regulatory 
scheme, including zoning regulations, strict scrutiny should apply.  
Similarly, the St. John’s court acknowledged that eminent domain may 
be used to take property that will subsequently be rezoned.187  Under 
St. John’s, where this type of condemnation and subsequent rezoning 
burdens free exercise, strict scrutiny under RLUIPA is appropriate. 
 
 181 Id. 
 182 St. John’s United Church of Christ, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 900 n.8. 
 183 See infra Part V. 
 184 City & County of Honolulu v. Sherman, 129 P.3d 542, 564 (Haw. 2006). 
 185 Id. at 545. 
 186 Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 
1203, 1222 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 187 St. John’s United Church of Christ, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 900. 
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V. STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW SHOULD APPLY WHERE THE EXERCISE OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN OR IMPLEMENTATION OF ZONING ORDINANCES 
BURDENS THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
A. The Individualized Assessment Exception to Smith 
In Employment Division v. Smith,188 the Supreme Court held that, 
where a generally applicable law has the incidental effect of burden-
ing free exercise of religion, the Court would apply rational basis re-
view.189  However, an exception to this general rule applies when the 
state assesses, on an individual basis, whether the generally applicable 
law should apply to a specific person or entity.190  In Smith, the Court 
distinguished its holdings in Sherbert v. Verner and Bowen v. Roy.191  The 
Court noted that in Sherbert, within the context of unemployment 
compensation, there was individualized governmental assessment of 
whether the employee conduct at issue merited the denial of unem-
ployment benefits.192  A strict scrutiny test was appropriate in this con-
text because the state weighed the employee’s justification for termi-
nating his employment on an individual basis.193 
The distinction between generally applicable laws and those with 
an individualized assessment mechanism is clarified in Bowen v. Roy.194  
In Bowen, appellee challenged a requirement in the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children Act195 and the Food Stamp Act196 that man-
dated that participants submit the social security numbers of the 
members of their households in order to receive benefits.197  The ap-
pellee maintained that obtaining a Social Security number for his 
minor daughter would violate their Native American religious beliefs 
and claimed that the Free Exercise Clause entitled him to an exemp-
tion from the general requirement.198  In upholding the requirement, 
the Court determined that it was neutral and uniform in application 
and, therefore, did not need to be justified as “the least restrictive 
 
 188 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 189 Id. at 883. 
 190 Id. at 884. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
 195 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (1994) (repealed 1996). 
 196 7 U.S.C. § 2025(e) (2000). 
 197 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 695. 
 198 Id. 
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means of accomplishing a compelling state interest.”199  Addressing 
Sherbert, the Court stated that in that case a strict scrutiny standard 
was appropriate because in determining if an employee should be 
denied unemployment benefits, the government agency would have 
to assess on an individual basis whether the employee had terminated 
his employment “without good cause.”200  Further, the court found 
“[t]he ‘good cause’ standard created a mechanism for individualized 
exemptions.  If a state creates such a mechanism, its refusal to extend 
an exemption to an instance of religious hardship suggests a discri-
minatory intent.”201  Because the required submission of a Social Se-
curity number in Bowen applied to all applicants, there was no indivi-
dualized assessment standard within the benefit programs, and 
therefore, a strict scrutiny standard did not apply.202 
B. The Application of Zoning Ordinances as Individualized 
Assessment 
RLUIPA sought to apply the individualized assessment exception 
of Smith to land use regulations that impermissibly burden the free 
exercise of religion.203  Specifically, Congress found that religious or-
ganizations “are frequently discriminated against on the face of zon-
ing codes and also in the highly individualized and discretionary 
processes of land use regulation.”204  As the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated in Freedom Baptist 
Church v. Township of Middletown,205 zoning ordinances by their nature 
require individualized assessments to determine on a case-by-case ba-
sis if the proposed activity is suitable to the land in question.206  In ap-
plying RLUIPA to zoning provisions, the Freedom Baptist court found 
that Congress codified “the individualized assessments jurisprudence 
in Free Exercise cases.”207  However, other courts have disagreed, find-
ing instead that zoning regulations do not require individualized as-
sessments. 
 
 199 Id. at 707–08. 
 200 Id. at 708. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at 708–09. 
 203 146 CONG. REC. 16,699 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy). 
 204 See id.at 16,698. 
 205 204 F. Supp. 2d 857 (D. Pa. 2002). 
 206 Id. at 868. 
 207 Id. 
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In Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne,208 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the applica-
tion of the city’s zoning code did not involve individualized assess-
ments.209  The Grace United Methodist Church (“Grace United”) 
sought to operate a child daycare center in the residential zone 
where it owned property and applied for a variance.210  After holding 
a public hearing, which included both witness testimony and evi-
dence on how the proposed daycare center would operate, the city 
denied the variance.211  Grace United challenged the city’s denial of 
the variance as a violation of both RLUIPA and the Free Exercise 
Clause.212  The city argued that the zoning ordinance was a generally 
applicable law, which should be subject only to rational basis review,213 
while Grace United argued that the zoning code’s system of case-by-
case exceptions provided an opportunity for individualized exemp-
tions.214  The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
agreed with the city, stating that “[w]hile it is true that the Board held 
a hearing to evaluate the Church’s daycare request . . . ‘that kind of 
limited yes-or-no inquiry is qualitatively different from the kind of 
case-by-case system envisioned by the Smith Court.’”215  Thus, the court 
held that the zoning code did not fall within the individualized as-
sessment exception of Smith.216  Applying rational basis review, the 
court found the denial of a variance did not offend either the Free 
Exercise Clause or RLUIPA.217 
A brief examination of the application process for a variance or 
conditional use permit illustrates that it is more than a limited in-
quiry and suggests that the approach of the Freedom Baptist court is 
the more accurate one.  In Vietnamese Buddhism Study Temple in Ameri-
ca v. City of Garden Grove,218 the temple applied for a CUP, which the 
 
 208 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 209 Id. at 653. 
 210 Id. at 647. 
 211 Id. at 648. 
 212 Id. at 647. 
 213 Id. at 650. 
 214 Grace United, 451 F.3d at 650. 
 215 Id. at 654 (quoting Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1298 (10th Cir. 
2004)). 
 216 Id. at 653; see also Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 
510 F.3d 253, 276 (3d Cir. 2007) (showing that the court declined “to hold that every 
zoning ordinance that includes a waiver or amendment provision is, solely by virtue 
of that fact, unconstitutional unless it can survive strict scrutiny”). 
 217 Grace United, 451 F.3d at 655. 
 218 460 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
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city planning commission denied twice.219  Discussing the CUP appli-
cation process, the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California found that, in fact, the temple was obligated to 
meet several conditions in order to obtain a CUP, including meeting 
requirements for minimum lot size, setback, parking, and access to 
public roads.220  Further, once these conditions were met, the city was 
required to make additional findings before the CUP could be is-
sued.221  Similarly, in Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. 
v. Broward County,222 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ele-
venth Circuit listed six factors the Boca Raton Board of Adjustment 
would consider when deciding whether to grant a variance.223  In fact, 
RLUIPA’s congressional record suggests that Congress did not con-
sider this type of application of a zoning code to be a generally appli-
cable law.224 
 
 219 Id. at 1169–70. 
 220 Id. at 1168. 
 221 Id.  Specifically, the proposed use: 
(1) must be consistent with the city's adopted general plan; (2) must 
not adversely affect the health, peace, comfort, or welfare of persons 
residing or working in the surrounding area; (3) must not unreasona-
bly interfere with the use, enjoyment, or valuation of surrounding 
property; and (4) must not jeopardize or endanger the public health, 
safety, or general welfare. 
Id. 
 222 450 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 223 Id. at 1301.  The criteria included: 
(1) That there are unique and special circumstances or conditions ap-
plying to the property in question, or to the intended use of the prop-
erty, that do not apply generally to other properties in the same dis-
trict; (2) That any alleged hardship is not self-created by any person 
having an interest in the property or is the result of mere disregard for, 
or ignorance of, the provisions of the Code; (3) That strict application 
of the provisions of the Code would deprive the petitioner of reasona-
ble use of the property for which the variance is sought; (4) That the 
variance proposed is the minimum variance which makes possible the 
reasonable use of the property; (5) That the granting of the variance 
will be in harmony with the general intent and purpose of the Code 
and that such variance will not be injurious to the area involved or oth-
erwise detrimental to the public welfare; (6) That there exists changed 
or changing circumstances which make approval of the variance ap-
propriate. 
Id. at 1301 n.2. 
 224 146 CONG. REC. 19,123 (2000) (statement of Rep. Canady). 
Section 2(a)(2)(C) applies the General Rule to cases in which the gov-
ernment has authority to make individualized assessments of the uses 
to which the property is put. Unlike the Commerce and Spending 
Clause sections, this section does not reach generally applicable laws. 
Laws that provide for individualized assessments of proposed uses are 
not generally applicable. 
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C. Eminent Domain May Be Exercised in a Manner That Requires an 
Individualized Assessment, and Therefore Should Be Subject to the 
Same Strict Scrutiny as Zoning Regulations Where a Substantial 
Burden Is Imposed on the Free Exercise of Religion 
Assuming that zoning ordinances always or often implicate indi-
vidual assessments, eminent domain may be applied in the same indi-
vidualized manner.  For example, a municipality may take a specific 
property instead of multiple properties over a larger area.  Where 
eminent domain targets a specific property, its use should be subject 
to strict scrutiny review if its application substantially burdens the free 
exercise of religion. 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff225 illustrates how eminent do-
main can be directed at particular properties.  In Midkiff, the Hawaii 
Housing Authority (HHA) targeted specific properties which would 
advance the legislature’s goal of breaking down concentrated land 
ownership.226  The Hawaii Legislature passed the Land Reform Act of 
1967 to address what the Supreme Court found was concentrated 
land ownership that had the negative effect of inflating land prices.227  
The Act authorized the HHA to condemn residential tracts and trans-
fer ownership in fee simple to existing lessees.228  The fee simple own-
er would be compensated with the fair market value of the fee inter-
est.229  Prior to condemning appellees’ land, the “HHA made the 
statutorily required finding that acquisition of appellees’ land would 
effectuate the public purposes of the Act . . . [and] directed appellees 
to negotiate . . . the sale of the designated properties.”230  The appellees 
challenged the Act as an unconstitutional exercise of the state’s po-
lice power.231  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit found the purpose of the Act did not conform to the public use 
requirement of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.232 
Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court found the 
Act’s purpose of normalizing the residential land use market by era-
dicating land oligopoly was a valid exercise of a state’s police power.233  
 
Id. 
 225 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 226 Id. at 232–34. 
 227 Id. at 232. 
 228 See id. at 233. 
 229 See id. at 234 n.2. 
 230 Id. (emphasis added). 
 231 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 235. 
 232 Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 233 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242. 
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The Court applied a deferential review to the Hawaii Legislature’s de-
termination that the Act was necessary to achieve this purpose.234  
Quoting Berman v. Parker,235 the Court found that “[o]nce the object is 
within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the 
exercise of eminent domain is clear.”236  Furthermore, the Court 
found that this level of judicial deference was no less appropriate 
where a state legislature had made the conclusion that the Act served 
a public purpose.237 
As Midkiff illustrates, eminent domain may be exercised in a 
manner that requires the specific targeting of individual properties.  
According to the Court’s holding in Employment Division v. Smith,238 
where such targeting occurs and imposes a substantial burden on free 
exercise, strict scrutiny review is appropriate.239  Distinguishing Sherbert 
v. Verner,240 the Smith Court determined that the denial of unemploy-
ment benefits in Sherbert required a determination by the Employ-
ment Division as to whether the employee’s reasons for terminating 
his employment were justifiable.241  A strict scrutiny examination was 
appropriate where this denial burdened the free exercise of religion 
because the state agency would be weighing the justifications of the 
particular individual.242  In other words, the agency would be assessing 
whether a generally applicable law should apply to a specific individ-
ual.  Similarly, in Midkiff the HHA conducted an individualized as-
sessment of particular properties to determine if their acquisition 
would further the purposes of the Land Reform Act of 1967.243  The 
HHA therefore determined whether the generally applicable law, the 
Land Reform Act of 1967, should apply to specific property.244  More-
over, if under RLUIPA Congress “codif[ied] the individualized as-
sessments jurisprudence in Free Exercise cases” as the Freedom Baptist 
court found,245 where eminent domain is exercised in an individua-
 
 234 Id. at 242–43. 
 235 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
 236 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240. 
 237 Id. at 244. 
 238 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 239 Id. at 884. 
 240 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 241 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 234 (1984). 
 244 Id. 
 245 Freedom Baptist Church v. Twp. of Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857, 868 (D. 
Pa. 2002). 
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lized manner, a strict scrutiny standard should be applied if the ac-
tion burdens the free exercise of religion. 
D. The Identification of Parcels for Takings Through Eminent Domain 
and the Public Hearing Requirement in State Eminent Domain 
Statutes Are Analogous to the Individualized Assessment That 
Occurs in the Application of Zoning Regulations 
As authorized by state constitutions, the state may take property 
for public use upon payment of just compensation.246  Further, this 
authority may be delegated to counties and municipalities,247 public 
transportation departments,248 and conservation and recreation de-
partments.249  The identification of property for taking through emi-
nent domain is necessarily an individualized process, as the state or 
municipality must designate which properties it intends to take.250 
Where a state statute requires a public hearing prior to an emi-
nent domain condemnation, the municipality or state individually as-
sesses the application of eminent domain to a particular property.  
This hearing requirement is thus analogous to the individualized as-
sessment that occurs in a zoning context, which under RLUIPA rece-
ives a strict scrutiny analysis if its application burdens the free exer-
 
 246 See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“Right of Eminent Domain: Private property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation as provided 
by law.”). 
 247 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 166.411 (West 2000) (“Eminent domain; uses or 
purposes” (authorizing municipalities to exercise the power of eminent domain for 
public improvement; public parks; use of sewerage or drainage; laying wires; for city 
buildings; and other municipal purposes)). 
 248 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 337.27 (West 2003) (“Exercise of power of eminent 
domain by department; procedure; title; cost: The power of eminent domain is 
vested in the department to condemn all necessary lands and property . . . for the 
purpose of securing and utilizing transportation rights-of-way . . . .”). 
 249 See, e.g.,VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-201 (West 2006). 
The Director [of the Department of Conservation and Recreation] is 
authorized to acquire . . . by the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main, areas, properties, lands or any estate or interest therein, of scenic 
beauty, recreational utility, historical interest, biological significance or 
any other unusual features which in his judgment should be acquired, 
preserved and maintained for the use, observation, education, health 
and pleasure of the people of Virginia. 
Id. 
 250 See, e.g., 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67201 (West 2009) (“Acquisition of lands 
and buildings: The board of supervisors may designate lands or buildings owned, 
leased or controlled by the township for use as parks, playgrounds . . . and acquire 
lands or buildings by lease, gift, devise, purchase or by the exercise of the right of 
eminent domain for recreational purposes.” (emphasis added)). 
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cise of religion.251  Because the application of eminent domain and a 
zoning law are analogous when applied in this individualized man-
ner, both methods of land use control should receive strict scrutiny 
review when challenged under RLUIPA. 
As part of formal eminent domain procedure, most states re-
quire some action by the condemnor prior to the condemnation.252  
For example, a state may require a resolution or finding by a con-
demnor stating that the condemnation is necessary, or the state may 
require the condemnor to begin compensation negotiations.253  Pro-
cedurally, the condemnor may take the property through an adminis-
trative procedure after which the condemnee is notified that the land 
has been taken.254  Or, the condemnor may take through a judicial 
proceeding where the court, without a jury, determines whether the 
right to take exists, followed by a compensation determination by an 
appraiser.255  Alternatively, the court, again without a jury, determines 
if there is a right to take, and the court or jury then determines the 
amount of just compensation.256 
To illustrate, in Illinois an eminent domain suit is commenced 
when the condemnor files a complaint in the county in which the 
property is located.257  Questions about the right to condemn and any 
disputes regarding compensation must be determined by a court 
hearing before a jury.258 
The Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency 
court emphasized the individualized nature of eminent domain hear-
ings.259  Cottonwood Christian Center had challenged the Cypress 
Redevelopment Agency’s denial of their CUP and subsequent con-
demnation of church property.260  The court found that the Redeve-
lopment Agency condemned Cottonwood’s property as a necessary 
step in the implementation of their broad redevelopment scheme.261  
Further, both the denial of the CUP and the exercise of eminent 
 
 251 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
 252 7 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2A.03 
(Rev. 3d ed. 2006). 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-101 (West 2003). 
 258 Id. 
 259 Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 
1203, 1223 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 260 Id. at 1215. 
 261 Id. at 1223. 
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domain power occurred in an individualized manner.262  The court 
emphasized that both actions were “quasi-judicial decisions wherein a 
municipal agency is required to hold public hearings, take testimony 
from the affected landowners, and make specific factual findings.”263  
Indeed, California eminent domain law requires that prior to autho-
rizing a condemnation, the public entity must adopt a resolution of 
necessity.264  Such a resolution may only be adopted after each indi-
vidual whose property will be affected has been given the opportunity 
to be heard265 on the location, manner of implementation, and public 
use aspects of the regulatory plan.266 
Hearings challenging the exercise of eminent domain require 
an individualized assessment of the taking as applied to a specific 
parcel of land.  Therefore, under the individualized assessment ex-
ception to Smith, where the application of a resolution authorizing 
the acquisition of property is applied in an individualized manner—
for example, where the municipality or state is required to assess the 
resolution’s effect on a specific parcel—strict scrutiny should be ap-
plied. 
In Smith, the Court approved the use of a strict scrutiny evalua-
tion in Sherbert because there was individualized governmental as-
sessment of whether the employee conduct at issue merited the deni-
al of unemployment benefits.267  Similarly, where the condemnation 
of religious property is challenged, the taking agency will be required 
to determine whether the possible infringement on the free exercise 
of religion merits an exception to the generally applicable resolution.  
 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. 
 264 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.220 (West 2007). 
 265 See id. § 1245.235. 
Notice and hearing; contents; conduct 
(a) The governing body of the public entity may adopt a resolution of 
necessity only after the governing body has given each person whose 
property is to be acquired by eminent domain . . . notice and a reason-
able opportunity to appear and be heard on the matters referred to in 
Section 1240.030. 
Id. 
 266 See id. § 1240.030. 
The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property 
for a proposed project only if all of the following are established: 
(a) The public interest and necessity require the project. 
(b) The project is planned or located in the manner that will be most 
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. 
(c) The property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project. 
Id. 
 267 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990). 
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Therefore, following current Supreme Court jurisprudence, where a 
state or municipality considers the impact of a generally applicable 
land use resolution on specific properties, strict scrutiny should be 
applied if the state or municipality chooses to apply the resolution in 
a manner that substantially burdens the free exercise of religion.  In 
fact, RLUIPA’s legislative history illustrates that with the Act, Con-
gress specifically sought to codify Smith’s individualized assessment 
exception.268  The Act’s legislative history indicates that its sponsors 
believed the Act to be necessary based on the “widespread pattern of 
discrimination against churches as compared to secular places of as-
sembly . . . .”269  Thus, although the Supreme Court had held ten years 
prior in Smith that strict scrutiny should apply in cases of individua-
lized assessment,270 RLUIPA’s sponsors clearly felt that the codifica-
tion of this standard was necessary.  Further, in order to guarantee 
consistency of the application of strict scrutiny review to both exercis-
es of eminent domain and the enforcement of zoning code provi-
sions that substantially burden the free exercise of religion, RLUIPA’s 
strict scrutiny mandate should apply to both tools of land use regula-
tion. 
VI. EMINENT DOMAIN CAN BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A  
CHANGE IN ZONING TO EFFECTUATE A REGULATORY SCHEME; 
THEREFORE EMINENT DOMAIN SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE  
SAME STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW AS ZONING 
Where eminent domain condemnations proceed or are used in 
conjunction with changes in zoning codes as a method to effectuate a 
broader land use regulatory scheme, it is incongruous to apply strict 
scrutiny to challenges where zoning laws burden the free exercise of 
religion but not where the exercise of eminent domain burdens the 
free exercise of religion.  Although eminent domain may not fall 
within the definition of land use regulation as RLUIPA currently 
stands,271 where both regulatory tools are used together for the pur-
 
 268 146 CONG. REC. 16,699 (2000). 
 269 Id.  
 270 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
 271 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5) (2006). 
The term “land use regulation” means a zoning or landmarking law, or 
the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or 
development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if the 
claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other 
property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to ac-
quire such an interest. 
Id. 
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pose of implementing a regulatory scheme, strict scrutiny review is 
appropriate if the condemnation substantially burdens the free exer-
cise of religion. 
A. Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Pillar of Fire272 
In the pre-Smith case Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Pillar of 
Fire, the Supreme Court of Colorado applied strict scrutiny review to 
the Denver Urban Renewal Authority’s condemnation of Pillar of 
Fire’s church.273  In 1967 Denver began its downtown Urban Renewal 
Project after determining the project area, which included the Pillar 
of Fire church, was blighted.274  The Denver Urban Renewal Authority 
(DURA) was authorized to condemn property within the area, and 
“[u]pon acquisition, the property was to be rezoned and redeve-
loped.”275  The court found the city’s interests in the renewal project 
outweighed Pillar of Fire’s interests in maintaining ownership of the 
building.276  Notably, for the prior thirty years the building had been 
used primarily as a commercial rooming house; it was used as a place 
of worship only once a month.277  The court found that DURA had no 
alternative means for accomplishing its goals and that the condemna-
tion was essential to the success of the renewal project.278  Pillar of Fire 
illustrates how eminent domain and zoning are used together as tools 
to effectuate a broader regulatory plan.  As the court found, the con-
demnation was a necessary step in a renewal process that included 
changes to the zoning code.279 
B. Eminent Domain Followed by Zoning Changes in the Valuation 
Context 
Under RLUIPA, if enforcement of a zoning law creates a sub-
stantial burden on free exercise, it is subject to strict scrutiny review.280  
Since eminent domain and zoning are frequently used together for 
the broader purpose of land use regulation, where the use of emi-
nent domain burdens free exercise, it should also be subject to strict 
scrutiny review.  Because changes to zoning codes frequently follow 
 
 272 552 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1976). 
 273 Id. at 25. 
 274 Id. at 24. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. at 25. 
 277 Id. at 24–25. 
 278 Pillar of Fire, 552 P.2d at 25. 
 279 Id. 
 280 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(2)(A)–(C), 2000cc-5(5) (2006). 
BOLLETTINO (Final Edit) 1/13/2010  5:17 PM 
1294 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1263 
exercises of eminent domain authority, courts regularly confront the 
issue of how to value property for compensation where a change in 
the zoning code is imminent.  When valuing property following a 
condemnation proceeding, the court must consider the highest and 
best use of the property.281  Most states set the valuation date by sta-
tute.282 
The Court of Appeals of Arizona confronted the issue of valua-
tion in Town of Paradise Valley v. Young Financial Services, Inc.283  When 
Paradise Valley was incorporated in 1961, all property was zoned as 
residential.284  Any zoning variance had to be approved by the Town 
Council, which would grant a special use permit.285  When the town 
condemned appellee’s parcel, appellee Young Financial Services 
sought to introduce evidence that it was reasonably probable that it 
would be able to obtain a special use permit for the property, which 
was adjacent to a municipal complex.286 
Addressing the town’s motion to suppress evidence on nonresi-
dential development, the court stated that, generally, the market val-
ue of condemned property is determined by taking account of only 
the permitted uses at the time of the condemnation.287  However, an 
exception to this rule exists where there is “reasonable probability” 
that a change in the zoning ordinance will occur in the near future.288  
The “project influence doctrine” is an exception to this exception.289  
As the court explained, the doctrine excludes evidence of an immi-
nent change in zoning that is the result of the proposed project for 
which the condemning authority is taking the property.290  This pat-
tern of condemnation immediately followed by a change in zoning 
occurs with such frequency that a doctrine has emerged to guide the 
 
 281 7 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 2A.03 
(Rev. 3d ed. 2006). 
 282 Christopher A. Bauer, Government Takings and Constitutional Guarantees: When 
Date of Valuation Statutes Deny Just Compensation, 2003 BYU L. REV. 265, 278 (2003) 
(finding that twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have no valuation date 
statute). 
 283 868 P.2d 971 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). 
 284 Id. at 973. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. at 974. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Town of Paradise Valley, 868 P.2d at 974. 
 290 Id.; see also Williams v. City and County of Denver, 363 P.2d 171, 175 (Colo. 
1961) (“[W]here the change in zoning results from the taking of the subject proper-
ty . . . it is not admissible . . . .” ). 
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courts in their quest to provide owners of the condemned property 
with just compensation. 
The Missouri Court of Appeals further articulated the doctrine 
in Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Jenkins,291 where the court affirmed 
the trial court’s decision to permit evidence regarding proposed zon-
ing changes.292  Describing the project influence doctrine, the court 
stated that “[t]he probability of rezoning (or even an actual change 
in zoning) which results from the fact that the project which is the 
basis for the taking was impending, cannot be taken into account in 
valuing the property in the condemnation proceeding.”293 
The project influence doctrine makes clear that an eminent 
domain condemnation is often followed by an immediate change in 
zoning regulations.  If such a zoning change were in itself to substan-
tially burden the free exercise of religion, it would be subject to strict 
scrutiny under RLUIPA.294  Therefore, where the two regulatory tools 
of eminent domain and subsequent rezoning are used in conjunction 
for the purpose of implementing a land use scheme, should the use 
of eminent domain burden free exercise, it likewise should be subject 
to strict scrutiny review. 
VII. THE NEED FOR STRICT SCRUTINY AFTER KELO 
In its landmark decision in Kelo v. City of New London,295 the Su-
preme Court held that taking property for economic purposes quali-
fied as a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment Tak-
ings Clause.296  The city would not be permitted to take property 
solely for the benefit of a private party; however, where the taking was 
necessary to effectuate a comprehensive plan meant to provide eco-
nomic benefits to the city, that exercise of eminent domain power 
was valid.297  Fearing the impact of a holding equating public use with 
economic benefit, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, a public in-
terest law firm focusing on religious land use and free exercise, sub-
mitted an amicus brief in support of the petitioners.298  The fund 
 
 291 648 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). 
 292 Id. at 568. 
 293 Id. at 560 (citing 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.322 [1] at 12-655 (3d ed. 
1981)) (court’s emphasis omitted). 
 294 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
 295 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 296 Id. at 485. 
 297 Id. at 486–87. 
 298 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of Pe-
titioners, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108). 
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feared that “[r]eligious institutions will always be targets for eminent 
domain actions under a scheme that disfavors non-profit, tax-exempt 
property owners . . . .”299  In fact, Shelley Ross Saxer, a professor at 
Pepperdine University School of Law, has echoed this fear.300  Saxer 
suggests that the application of strict scrutiny to eminent domain ac-
tions against religious property is necessary to offset the ease with 
which cities may remove the substantial burden involved by paying 
the owner just compensation.301 
Although the words “eminent domain” do not appear within the 
congressional record for RLUIPA,302 it is conceivable that lawmakers 
were not focused on the impact eminent domain could have on reli-
gious property; the RLUIPA hearings took place in 2000, a full five 
years before the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Kelo.  In light 
of Kelo’s new standard equating “public use” with “public purpose,” 
there is even more reason to apply strict scrutiny to exercises of emi-
nent domain which substantially burden the free exercise of religion.  
Further, as Albanian Associated Fund v. Township of Wayne303 illustrates, 
religious institutions are particularly vulnerable to the ad hoc deci-
sions of municipal planning boards.  The AAF was required to revise 
its site plan three times and appeared before the planning board over 
twenty times, which undoubtedly entailed tremendous expense.304  
RLUIPA’s supporters clearly intended that the Act function as a 
means of avoiding this type of burden where it is not justified by a 
compelling government interest.305 
VIII.CONCLUSION 
Eminent domain is a fundamental power exercised by the state, 
but its exercise must be balanced with the equally fundamental right 
of free exercise.  In its current form RLUIPA mandates strict scrutiny 
review of zoning and landmarking laws; however, courts have debated 
whether this standard should be extended to eminent domain chal-
lenges.  Eminent domain may be considered a generally applicable 
power, but it is frequently exercised in a manner that requires an in-
 
 299 Id. at 3. 
 300 Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amendment Land Uses, 
69 MO. L. REV. 653, 673  (2004). 
 301 Id. at 674. 
 302 146 CONG. REC. 16,698–705 (2000). 
 303 No. 06-cv-3217 (PGS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73176 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007). 
 304 Complaint, supra note 13, at 10. 
 305 See 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kenne-
dy). 
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dividualized assessment of its potential impact.  It is this individua-
lized assessment that should bring eminent domain within the strict 
scrutiny purview of RLUIPA.  Further, because eminent domain and 
zoning are frequently used together to enforce a land use regulatory 
scheme, it would be incongruous to demand strict scrutiny review of 
one regulatory tool and not the other.  Eminent domain is an impor-
tant and necessary power; however, free exercise is equally funda-
mental.  Strict scrutiny review does not mean that the state is forbid-
den from condemning religious property; it simply means that 
condemnation must be justified by a compelling state interest and 
that the state action in question must be narrowly tailored to address 
that interest.  Because free exercise is a fundamental right protected 
by the Constitution, it should be protected by strict scrutiny review. 
